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INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Todd Allen Parker relies 
brief for the statements 
jurisdiction, the issues, the case, the facts, and the summary c-
the argument. Appellant responds to thr fl'taff JI -SM,,,:, , M i L Iiis 
I >ilows. 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
This issue involves a question of ]aw which this Court 
reviews for correctness. See Appellant's opening brief ai i 
TEXT OF STATUTES, RULES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The text che following statutes, rules 
constitutic t , IUIMIHM M i \ addendum. 
Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 
Article I, § 7, Utah constitution 
Article I, § 12, Utah constitution 
Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedu 
Amendment VI, United States constitution 
Amendment XIV, United States constitution 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The trial court had jurisdiction over Appellant's motion 
pursuant to Rule 22(e), Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure and 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In addition, due process 
requires that the trial judge have jurisdiction since the fees 
should have been returned incidental to dismissal of the appeal. 
Due process requires that the fees be returned. An 
evidentiary hearing is required to determine the exact amount paid 
by Mr. Parker. The exclusionary rule and its purposes and the 
admissibility of evidence at a civil action filed by the defendant 
to recover monetary damages after his or her fourth amendment rights 
are violated are irrelevant to the issue in this case. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT HAD JURISDICTION OVER 
APPELLANTS MOTION, AND THIS COURT HAS JURISDICTION 
OVER THE INSTANT APPEAL. 
(Reply to Point I of Appellee's Brief) 
A. THIS ISSUE IS PROPERLY BEFORE THE COURT. 
Without providing any support for its claim, the State 
argues that Rule 59(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure is 
jurisdictional and precludes Appellant from pursuing the return of 
fees in this case. The State's position is without merit and, if 
accepted by this Court, would result in a due process violation. 
Pursuant to Rule 81(e), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the 
Rules of Civil Procedure "govern in any aspect of criminal 
proceedings where there is no other applicable statute or rule, 
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provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict with any 
statutory or constitutional requirement." 
A : - > /ii «| ii I I i "I ill I i I I 11 in ' I I I' I " I I ' M i I 
sentence remained in effect in this case after the trial judge 
entered his order1 of dismissal. Even though the charges themselves 
llli-ul been i l i s n i i ss i i i l l , (llliiiiii in I I IJ*J(H II i>nl M I v m r i ik i i mu l in " I b| 
virtue of Appellant's funds which the State continuec hold. 
Hence, the trial judge had jurisdiction over Appellant's motior 
return fees pursuant t :: R i] c= 2 2 (€ ) 
Assuming, arguendo, that this Court does not agree that 
Rule 22(e) controls this issue, the trial judge nevertheless had 
jurisdiction over Appellant's motion. To the extent Rules 
Civil Procedure play a role in this issue, Rule 60(b), not 
Rule 59(e^ 
Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in 
pertinent part: 
(b) Mistakes, inadvertence; excusable 
neglect; newly discovered evidence; fraudf etc. 
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the 
court may in the furtherance of justice relieve 
party of his legal representative from a final 
judgment, order, or proceeding for the following 
reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or 
excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been 
1. The trial judge entered an "order", not "judgment", of 
dismissal. The reason listed for the dismissal is that this Court 
"ordered the State's evidence be suppressed." R. 52. Arguably, 
this "order" was not a final judgment of dismissal, and after the 
judge entered his order regarding the fees, the two orders should 
have been incorporated into a "Judgment of Dismissal." If the order 
is not considered » "judgment, Rule 59(e) is inapplicable. 
discovered in time to move for a new trial under 
Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore 
denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), 
misrepresentation or other misconduct of an 
adverse party; (4) when, for any cause, the 
summons in an action has not been personally 
served upon the defendant as required by 
Rule 4(e) and the defendant has failed to appear 
in said action; (5) the judgment is void; (6) the 
judgment has been satisfied, released, or 
discharged, or a prior judgment upon which it is 
based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or 
it is no longer equitable that the judgment 
should have prospective application; or (7) any 
other reason justifying relief from the operation 
of the judgment. The motion shall be made within 
a reasonable time and for reasons (1), (2), (3), 
or (4), not more than 3 months after the 
judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or 
taken. A motion under this Subdivision (b) does 
not affect the finality of a judgment or suspend 
its operation. This rule does not limit the 
power of a court to entertain an independent 
action to relieve a party from a judgment, order 
or proceeding or to set aside a judgment for 
fraud upon the court. The procedure for 
obtaining any relief from a judgment shall be by 
motion as prescribed in these rules or by an 
independent action. 
This rule clarifies that a trial judge has continuing 
jurisdiction over a case to correct a judgment based on any of the 
enumerated reasons, or for "any other reason justifying relief from 
the operation of the judgment." Appellant's motion for return of 
fees falls within this rule. Under Subsection (7), Appellant had 
longer than the three-month limit of Subsections (1), (2), (3), or 
(4) in which to file his motion. The motion in the present case, 
filed nineteen days after the order was filed, was timely. 
In addition, even if Rule 59(e) were applicable, neither 
the language of the rule nor case law suggests that the time limit 
is jurisdictional, or that failure to file a motion under 59(e) 
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deprives the court of jurisdiction over the case or precludes the 
court from hearing the motion. 
Case law discusses the importance of filing a timely motion 
for new trial. In Burgers v. Maiben, 652 P.2d 1320, 1321 (Utah 
1982), the Supreme Court held in a civil case that when a party 
files an untimely motion for new trial, "the trial court's only 
alternative is to deny the motion."2 Hence, the trial court is not 
deprived of jurisdiction even when a new trial motion is filed late; 
instead, it is merely deprived of the opportunity to decide the case 
in the moving party's favor. In the criminal context, Rule 24, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure allows expansion of the time in which to 
file a motion for new trial in criminal cases. 
In State v. Belqard, 830 P.2d 264 (Utah 1992), the Court 
held that the defendant could appeal the trial judge's denial of his 
motion to arrest judgment even though such motion was filed after 
sentencing and based on the defendant's claim that his trial counsel 
had failed to file a motion to suppress. The Court pointed out that 
the trial court had held an evidentiary hearing, and "[i]mplicit in 
granting the post-judgment evidentiary hearing was the trial court's 
finding that there was cause to grant the relief." Id. at 266. 
As Appellant outlined in his opening brief, due process 
requires that the court return fines and fees paid by a defendant 
2. Burgers also clarified that an untimely motion for new trial 
does not stay the thirty-day period for filing a Notice of Appeal. 
The thirty-day limit for filing a Notice of Appeal is 
jurisdictional. The appellate court does not have jurisdiction 
unless the notice is timely filed; by contrast, the trial court 
already had jurisdiction in this case. 
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after a conviction is overturned on appeal. Dismissing a case 
without returning fines and fees, as required by due process, is 
precisely the type of inadvertence or mistake covered by 
Rule 60(b). Furthermore, not allowing a criminal defendant access 
to the court for return of fees as part of the criminal proceeding 
would be a gross violation of due process. Where fines and fees are 
not returned to the defendant incidental to the dismissal, due 
process requires that the defendant be able to pursue that return as 
part of the criminal matter. 
The State's claim that the case ceased to exist and that 
this was "a free-floating motion" is incorrect in light of 
Rule 60(a) and (b). The State recognizes that its argument might 
"seem technical and unfairly arbitrary." State's brief at 12. In 
addition, it would violate due process, lead to unnecessary 
expenditure of valuable court resources needed if defendants were 
required to file separate actions, and result in a lack of fairness 
and equity in criminal proceedings. 
Return of the fines and fees is "incident to the vacating 
and setting aside of the conviction." United States v. Lewis, 478 
F.2d 835, 836 (E.D. La. 1972). Where a trial court fails to return 
such fines and fees when setting aside the conviction, due process 
requires that the defendant be entitled to return regardless of the 
timing of his motion. 
The State complains that if this Court determines that 
Appellant's motion was timely, "who can then deny some other former 
criminal defendant twenty days, thirty days, or several months or 
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years, to advance some similar request?" State's brief at 13. 
Since the return of fines and fees after dismissal should be 
automatic or incidental to that dismissal, Appellant fails to 
understand the threat caused by that rare case that slips through 
the cracks, with a defendant later requesting return of fines and 
fees. Despite the State's attempt to argue otherwise, there is no 
"slippery slope" threat caused by the procedure utilized in this 
case. In addition, Appellant's request was not made months or years 
later, but nineteen days after the trial judge entered the order. 
"Stability, predictability, and finality" (State's brief at 
14) along with fairness, reasonableness and due process require that 
fines and fees be returned to a criminal defendant where the case is 
subsequently dismissed, and that no arbitrary time limits be placed 
on a defendant for petitioning a court which fails to make such 
return part of the dismissal. 
B. REQUIRING APPELLANT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION 
VIOLATES DUE PROCESS. 
The State suggests that Appellant is entitled to file a 
civil action, then attempts to set forth the prospective arguments 
of the State and Mr. Parker in such a civil action. State's brief 
at 14-5. The State's discussion is irrelevant to the issues before 
this Court. 
The State argues first that "dismissal of this appeal 
should be without prejudice to Mr. Parker's right to file a civil 
complaint, if he so wishes, seeking recovery of the fees he paid to 
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Fremont." State's brief at 14 (emphasis added). As previously 
outlined, due process requires the return of such fees as incidental 
to the dismissal. Neither due process nor the Rules of Criminal or 
Civil Procedure require filing a separate action. Fundamental 
fairness requires that a defendant not be required to file a 
separate action. 
After arguing that Mr. Parker could file a civil action for 
return of fees paid to Fremont, the State then jumps the track and 
discusses a separate civil action, in which the State claims "Parker 
will presumably complain that he was monetarily damaged by his 
unconstitutional treatment at the hands of the officers who arrested 
him." State's brief at 14. This would be a distinct civil action 
from an action for return of the fees. Whether officers violated 
Appellant's constitutional rights so as to require payment of 
monetary damages has nothing to do with the issue of whether the 
fees should be returned to Appellant. 
Fines and fees are returned after a case is dismissed; the 
issue of "factual guilt" is irrelevant. Where a defendant is not 
convicted, sentence cannot stand. Whether or not "factual guilt" 
would be admissible in the State's fictional civil lawsuit is 
irrelevant to this Court's determination in this case. This Court 
should disregard the State's efforts to cloud the issues by arguing 
that Appellant is factually guilty and therefore should not prevail. 
POINT II. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FAILING TO 
RETURN THE FEES PAID BY APPELLANT. 
(Reply to Point II of Appellee's Brief) 
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The exclusionary rule and its purposes are also irrelevant 
to the issue before this Court- The State acknowledges that "Parker 
has a strong argument for a refund of the fines that he paid" 
(State's brief at 16) but claims that the deterrence purpose of the 
exclusionary rule would not be served by returning the fees paid to 
Fremont. State's brief at 17-18. 
First, these arguments are inconsistent. If the deterrence 
rationale of the exclusionary rule were the controlling concern, 
there is no reason to distinguish between the fines and fees; the 
State's argument should include both. 
But, more importantly, the exclusionary rule has nothing to 
do with the issue before the Court. 
The State fails to cite any authority for its claim that 
the fees should not be returned because the purposes of the 
exclusionary rule would not be served. Instead, the State cites a 
case that holds that evidence that was suppressed in a criminal case 
pursuant to the exclusionary rule was admissible in the defendant's 
subsequent civil action for false arrest. See McDaniel v. City of 
Seattle, 828 P.2d 81 (Wash. App. 1992). The issue addressed in 
McDaniel is distinct from the issue in the instant case, and the 
McDaniel holding is irrelevant to the issue before this Court. 
The issue in this case is whether the fees should be 
returned upon dismissal of the action. The State claims that 
Appellant benefitted from his time at Fremont and got a bargain so 
is not entitled to a return of fees. Such an argument could also be 
made any time an individual pays a fine in a case which is 
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subsequently dismissed. It could be argued that an individual 
benefitted from paying the fine and learned how better to conduct 
himself. But that is not the issue. The issue is whether due 
process requires the return of fines/fees paid after being ordered 
to do so in a case which is subsequently dismissed. 
While the State may think Mr. Parker benefitted from the 
incarceration at Fremont, Mr. Parker may well perceive that 
experience as an unpleasant one in which he participated only 
because the judge ordered him to do so. Despite the State's 
exaggerated response, Mr. Parker is merely requesting the return of 
fees paid by him as part of a sentence in a case subsequently 
dismissed. 
Finally, while Appellant objects to the State relying on 
affidavits which are not part of the record,3 he recognizes that the 
record does not establish the amount paid by him to Fremont.4 
Appellant respectfully requests that this Court enter an order 
requiring the return of fees paid by him to Fremont as part of the 
3. Appellant moves this Court pursuant to Rules 11 and 23, Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure to strike the affidavits of Vicki 
Marker and Judy Sahm of the Fremont Center and the "Private 
Memorandum" from Vicki Harker to Trina Mann which are contained in 
Appendix II to the State's brief. These papers are not contained 
in the record in this case, and this Court should not encourage the 
State's improper reliance on material not in the record. 
4. It is apparent in reviewing the record that the exact amount 
paid by Mr. Parker to the Fremont Center is not contained therein. 
Appellant recognizes the need for an evidentiary hearing on the 
issue of the amount paid by Mr. Parker. This Court should not rely 
on the affidavits prepared by the State, which are not part of the 
record, in determining amount. 
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sentence and remand the case to the trial judge for an evidentiary 
hearing as to the exact amount due Appellant.5 
CONCUJSION 
Appellant Parker respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the trial court's order denying the return of fees paid to a 
state-run treatment program and remand the case for an evidentiary 
hearing as to the exact amount to be paid. 
5. Although the State does not develop any such argument in the 
argument section of its brief, it suggests in its statement of facts 
that a portion of the fees returned to Mr. Parker "should be 
attributed to Parker's counsel." State's brief at 6. The basis of 
the State's suggestion appears to be its concern that counsel for 
Mr. Parker requested an extension of time in which to file the reply 
brief in the underlying appeal while Mr. Parker was incarcerated at 
Fremont. The State's unsupported and unconstitutional suggestion 
should be rejected by this Court. First, the request for extension 
of time in which to file a reply brief does not prolong the time a 
case spends on appeal. Cases are at issue in this Court after 
Respondent files its brief; in criminal cases, the case is 
calendared based on the filing of Respondent's brief. Hence, an 
extension request on a reply brief does not extend the time a case 
spends on appeal; it only extends the date on which the brief must 
be filed. Second, and most important, a criminal defendant has a 
federal and state constitutional right to adequate representation on 
appeal. Mr. Parker is represented by court-appointed counsel. As 
this Court is aware, the three lawyers in the Appellate Division 
handle all felony and capital homicide appeals in the Salt Lake 
Legal Defender Association. In order to adequately represent 
clients, the appellate attorneys require extensions of the 
thirty-day period on many briefs. To the extent Mr. Parker's 
lawyers needed an extension of time in order to adequately represent 
him, due process, the sixth amendment, and Article I, Section 12 
require that they be given extensions without later having to pay 
for such extensions. The extensions in the underlying Parker cases 
were not unusual in any way and were needed in order to adequately 
prepare the briefs. The State also requested a thirty-day extension 
of time in which to prepare its brief. 
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SUBMITTED t h i s <3-tfL day o f November, 1993 . 
<->fe»v. />(?52/ 
JOAN C. WATT 
Attorney for Defendant/Appellant 
Vta'Q. &*»{ 
LISA J. HEMAL 
Attorneys for De fendant/Appel1ant 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I, JOAN C. WATT, hereby certify that I have caused to be 
delivered eight copies of the foregoing to the Utah Court of 
Appeals, 230 South 500 East, Suite 400, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102, 
and four copies to the Attorney General's Office, 236 State Capitol, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114, this CHL day of November, 1993. 
<Tfr-Cu)cny 
JOAN C. WATT 
DELIVERED this {__ day of November, 1993. 
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ADDENDUM 
Rule 59. New trials; amendments of judgment. 
(e) Motion to alter or amend a judgment A motion to alter or amend the 
judgment shall be served not later than 10 days after entry of the judgment. 
Compiler's Notes. — This rule is similar to Jurors competency as witness as to validity 
Rule 59, F.R.C.P. of verdict or indictment. Rules of Evidence, 
Cross-References. — Fee for filing motion Rule 606. 
for new trial, § 21-2-2. 
Harmless error not ground for new trial. 
Rule 61. 
Rule 60. Relief from judgment or order. 
(b) Mistakes; inadvertence; excusable neglect; newly discovered evi-
dence; fraud, etc. On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may 
in the furtherance of justice relieve a party or his legal representative from a 
final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons: (1) mistake, 
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; (2) newly discovered evidence 
which by due diligence could not have been discovered in time to move for a 
new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud (whether heretofore denominated intrin-
sic or extrinsic), misrepresentation or other misconduct of an adverse party; 
PART XI. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS. 
Rule 81. Applicability of rules in general. 
(e) Application in criminal proceedings- These rules of procedure shall 
also govern in any aspect of criminal proceedings where there is no other 
applicable statute or rule, provided, that any rule so applied does not conflict 
with any statutory or constitutional requirement. 
CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process 
of law. 
Sec. 12. [Rights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear and 
defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of the 
accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own behalf, to 
be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compulsory process' to 
compel the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, to have a speedy public 
trial by an impartial jury of the county or district in which the offense is 
alleged to have been committed, and the right to appeal in all cases. In no 
iratance shall any accused person, before final judgment, be compelled to 
advance money or fees to secure the rights herein guaranteed. The accused 
shall not be compelled to give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be 
compelled to testify against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor 
shall any person be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
History: Const 1896. 
Cross-References. — Rights of defendants, 
statutory provisions, § 77-1-6. 
UTAH RULES OF CRIMINAL 
PROCEDURE 
Rule 22. Sentence, judgment and commitment 
(a) Upon the entry of a plea or verdict of guilty or plea of no contest, the 
court shall set a time for imposing sentence which shall be not less than two 
nor more than 30 days after the verdict or plea, unless the court, with the 
concurrence of the defendant, otherwise orders. Pending sentence, the court 
may commit the defendant or may continue or alter bail or recognizance. 
Before imposing sentence the court shall afford the defendant an opportu-
nity to make a statement in his own behalf and to present any information in 
mitigation of punishment, or to show any legal cause why sentence should not 
be imposed. The prosecuting attorney shall also be given an opportunity to 
present any information material to the imposition of sentence. 
(b) On the same grounds that a defendant may be tried in his absence, he 
may likewise be sentenced in his absence. If a defendant fails to appear for 
sentence, a warrant for his arrest may be issued by the court. 
(c) Upon a verdict or plea of guilty or plea of no contest, the court shall 
impose sentence and shall enter a judgment of conviction which shall include 
the plea or the verdict, if any, and the sentence. Following imposition of 
sentence, the court shall advise the defendant of his right to appeal and the 
time within which any appeal shall be filed. 
(d) When a jail or prison sentence is imposed, the court shall issue its 
commitment setting forth the sentence. The officer delivering the defendant to 
the jail or prison shall deliver a true copy of the commitment to the jail or 
prison and shall make his return on the commitment and file it with the court. 
(e) The court may correct an illegal sentence, or a sentence imposed in an 
illegal manner, at any time. 
Cross-References. — Pre-sentence investi- Suspending imposition of sentence and plac-
gation, § 76-3-404. ing defendant on probation, § 77-18-1. 
Rules of evidence inapplicable to sentencing 
and probation proceedings, Rule 1101, U.R.E. 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT VI 
[Rights of accused.] 
crime shall have ^ c 2 ^ ^ S S £ ^ K d i r t £ w , w r e £ t h* 
ascertained by law, and to be i n f a m S ^ T*"«* s h a 1 1 ^ave been previously 
tUm; to be c&bartS w i t h , t h ? S « ° , * » * « • • • * <*** of the accusa-
process for o b S f w S n e s s e s fa h£"St *""? * ? to hxn compulsory 
counsel for hiTZ^ ** f a V ° r ' " * to **» * • Assistance rf 
AMENDMENT XIV 
Section 1. [Citizenship — Due process of law — Equal 
protection.] 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein 
they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State 
deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor 
deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. [Representatives — Power to reduce appoint-
ment] 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any election 
for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the United States, 
Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial Officers of a State, or 
the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to any of the male inhabit-
ants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United 
States, or in any way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other 
crime, the basis of representation therein shall be reduced in the proportion 
which the number of such male citizens shall bear to the whole number of 
male citizens twenty-one years of age in such State. 
Sec. 3. [Disqualification to hold office.] 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, as a 
member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a member of 
any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any State, to 
support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged in insurrec-
tion or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the enemies 
thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, remove such 
disability. 
Sec. 4. [Public debt not to be questioned — Debts of the 
Confederacy and claims not to be paid.] 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized bv law 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and biiiSmSmn^^ 
suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be quu&me±B^S^ 
United States nor any State shall assume or pay'any debt or o b S o ^ n ! 
SSZ fnrZ l ° f l n S U r r e c t l o n o r r e 5 e I I i o n gainst the United S t a t e l T a n y 
^J^jRvsnss %rJ?«but •n such **•• • " " • — J 
Sec. 5. [Power to enforce amendment.] 
^StaTffSbSuT po"er to enfcrce'by appropriate l e * i 3 "* i °" . «•» 
History: Proposed by Congress on June 16, 
1866; declared to have been ratified by three-
fourths of all the states on July 28, 1868. 
